On April 17, 2018, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018), holding that the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. SS 16's definition of "crime of violence" is unconstitutionally vague. Having deja vu? You're not alone. In striking SS 16's residual clause, Dimaya relied on a "straightforward application" of its 2015 decision in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). In Johnson, the Supreme Court deemed a similar residual clause in the "violent felony" definition of the Armed Career Criminal Act to be void for vagueness.

So, how does Dimaya affect your clients? In this webinar, we will explore the impact of Dimaya on federal criminal statutes, and particularly its applicability to 18 U.S.C. SS 924(c). We will identify the many reasons why Dimaya should apply to SS 924(c) cases and provide you with the responses needed to refute the government's contrary position. You will also learn how to challenge your client's predicate conviction under the remaining portion of the "crime of violence" definition - the force clause. Finally, the webinar will address how to overcome procedural obstacles, such as a defendant's appellate waiver, on direct review.

This webinar is targeted to practitioners with a working knowledge of the categorical and modified categorical approaches, a familiarity with the Supreme Court's related holding in Johnson v. United States, and a basic understanding of the "crime of violence" definitions in 18 U.S.C. SS 16 and 18 U.S.C. SS 924(c)(3).